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ASYLUM FOR FORMER MEXICAN POLICE 
OFFICERS PERSECUTED BY THE NARCOS 
Sergio Garcia* 
Abstract: Since President Felipe Calderón declared war against Mexico’s 
narcotraffickers in 2006, drug violence has escalated and has claimed the 
lives of over 2000 Mexican police officers. To successfully petition for asy-
lum in the United States, former Mexican police officers facing persecu-
tion by the Narcos must prove that they are members of a particular social 
group. In past cases, courts have refused to find that persecution by the 
Narcos qualifies a petitioner as a member of a particular social group. This 
Article argues, however, that former Mexican police officers facing perse-
cution by the Narcos are members of a particular social group based on a 
shared past experience and should be granted asylum in the United States. 
Introduction 
 In December 2006, shortly after taking office, Mexican President 
Felipe Calderón launched a campaign to combat narcotraffickers (“the 
Narcos”).1 Since that time, Mexico has suffered more than 28,000 casu-
alties in its war against the Narcos.2 Mexican law enforcement, in par-
ticular, has increasingly been the target of violence.3 Among those killed 
                                                                                                                      
* J.D., Indiana University–Bloomington, 1998. The author recently clerked for the 
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thank Jayne Garcia for all her intellectual contributions and support in writing this article. 
The author also wishes to thank Judge Alarcón for his support in producing this article. 
1 See Nicholas Casey, Mexico Under Siege: Business Heads Plead As Drug Gangs Terrorize 
Wealthy City, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 2010, at A1; 6 Abducted Police Found Slain in Mexican State, 
Boston.com (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/ 
2010/09/19/6_abducted_police_found_slain_in_mexican_state/. The term “narcotraffickers,” 
or “Narcos” as used in this paper, refers to members of the Mexican cartels. Both are misno-
mers, however, because narcotics trafficking is not necessarily the sole business enterprise of 
the cartels. Edgardo Buscaglia, México Pierde la Guerra, Esquire Mex., Mar. 2010, at 99, 100–05. 
2 See Casey, supra note 1. 
3 See Drug Lords Go After Mexican Police Officers, MSNBC (May 18, 2008), http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/24695115. 
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were 2,076 Mexican police officers.4 In 2009 alone, close to 500 police 
officers were killed as a result of the country’s drug violence.5 
 In response to the government crackdown, the Narcos are attack-
ing police officers in cities throughout Mexico in an effort to “‘destabi-
lize the police force.’”6 The violence against police officers is persistent 
and bloody.7 In June 2010, the Narcos murdered ten federal police of-
ficers near a high school in the state of Michoacán.8 The Michoacán 
cartel, responsible for this attack, was also responsible for murdering 
twelve federal police officers, whose bloodied and tortured bodies were 
found dumped along a highway the previous year.9 In September 2010, 
newspapers reported the deaths of fourteen Mexican police officers at 
the hands of the Narcos—eight in the Pacific Coast State of Guerrero 
and six in the Gulf Coast State of Tamaulipas.10 On a single day in Oc-
tober 2010, the Narcos, using grenades and assault rifles, ambushed 
and killed nine police officers in the State of Jalisco.11 
 The town of Ciudad Juárez has been one of many brutal battle-
grounds for law enforcement.12 As of September 2010, the Narcos had 
killed 102 police officers in Ciudad Juárez since the beginning of the 
year.13 One Mexican police officer was found dismembered.14 The po-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Gustavo Castillo & Georgina García, Nivela el Narco Déficit Salarial de Policías Mu-
nicipales: García Luna, La Jornada, 5 (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/ 
08/07/index.php?section=politica&article=005n1pol; Rubén Mosso, Paga Crimen Organi-
zado mil 200 MDP al mes a Policías Municipales, Milenio (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.milenio. 
com/node/502900. 
5 David A. Shirk, Trans-Border Inst., Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analy-
sis from 2001–2009, at 1, 8 ( Jan. 2010), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/ 
pubs/2010-Shirk-JMP-Drug_Violence.pdf. 
6 Drug Lords Go After Mexican Police Officers, supra note 3 (quoting Mayor José Reyes Fer-
riz). 
7 See Shirk, supra note 5, at 8; 9 Policemen Killed in Ambush in Western Mexico, Fox News 
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/10/29/policemen-killed-ambush-
western-mexico/; Al Menos Seis Policías Muertos en un Enfrentamiento en el Norte de México, El 
Mundo (Sept. 8. 2010), http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/09/08/mexico/1283978494. 
html [hereinafter Al Menos Seis Policías Muertos]. 
8 See 10 Mexican Federal Police Killed in Gang Attack Near High School, Fox News (June 
14, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/06/14/mexican-federal-police-killed-gang- 
attack-near-high-school/. 
9 Id. 
10 See 6 Abducted Police Found Slain in Mexican State, supra note 1; Al Menos Seis Policías 
Muertos, supra note 7. 
11 See 9 Policemen Killed in Ambush in Western Mexico, supra note 7. 
12 See Number of Officers Killed in Mexico Border City Tops 100 as Drug War Drags On, Fox 
News (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/10/02/number-officers-killed- 
mexico-border-city-tops-drug-war-drags/. 
13 Id. 
2011] Asylum for Former Mexican Police Officers 247 
lice officer’s hands, feet, head, legs, and arms had been “pulled off” and 
his severely mutilated body was found outside a strip mall.15 Earlier in 
2010, two police cars in Ciudad Juárez were ambushed and at least seven 
police officers were killed in a midday attack.16 Also in early 2010, Mexi-
can drug lord Teodoro García Simental was captured; this Narco, along 
with another Narco known as Muletar, was responsible for the murders 
of forty-five officers.17 Newspapers report similar incidents daily.18 
 The Narcos’ attacks on police officers are forcing the resignation 
of many police officers who do not want to participate in Narco activi-
ties.19 For these former police officers, asylum in the United States 
could represent their only possibility of survival. This Article will discuss 
how former Mexican police officers who are facing persecution from 
the Narcos qualify for asylum protection as members of a particular 
social group based on a shared past experience. Part I will briefly dis-
cuss asylum law in general and address how the federal courts define 
“persecution” and “particular social group” in asylum law. Part II will 
look at how the federal courts have historically dealt with asylum claims 
involving the Narcos. Part III will examine the current Narco problem 
in Mexico, the Mexican government’s lack of success fighting the Nar-
cos, and how that lack of success is endangering law enforcement offi-
cers. Finally, Part IV will argue that former law enforcement officers fit 
within the definition of a particular social group based on a shared past 
experience, qualifying them for asylum protection. 
I. Asylum Law in General 
A. Defining “Persecution” 
 To qualify for asylum in the United States, applicants must show 
that they have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecu-
                                                                                                                      
14 Mexican Police Officer Found Dismembered in Ciudad Juárez, Gazette (Montreal) (Aug. 
8, 2010), http://montrealgazette.com/news/Mexican+police+officer+found+dismem- 
bered+Ciudad+Juarez/3374793/story.html. 
15 Id. 
16 Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Under Siege: 8 Killed in Juárez Ambush, L.A. Times, Apr. 24, 
2010, at AA2. 
17 Richard Marosi, Mexico Under Siege: Narco Ballads Without a Home, L.A. Times, Aug. 
12, 2010, at A1. 
18 See, e.g., Mexican Police Officer Found Dismembered in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 14; Num-
ber of Officers Killed in Mexico Border City Tops 100 as Drug War Drags On, supra note 12. 
19 Drug Lords Go After Mexican Police Officers, supra note 3 (“More than 100 of [Ciudad 
Juárez’s] 1,700-member force have resigned or retired since January [2010].”). 
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tion in their home country.20 The Immigration and Naturalization Act 
(INA) explains that granting asylum is appropriate when an applicant 
can prove that he or she “is unable or unwilling to return to, and is un-
able or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion . . . .”21 
 The INA does not define “persecution.”22 Courts, however, agree 
that the level of harm experienced by the applicant must be severe in 
order to constitute persecution.23 To show persecution, “‘a person’s 
experience must rise above unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic 
suffering.’”24 
 An applicant may also qualify for asylum by demonstrating a well-
founded fear of persecution.25 This standard contains both a subjective 
and an objective component.26 To satisfy these components, “an alien 
must actually fear that he will be persecuted upon return to his coun-
try, and he must present evidence establishing an ‘objective situation’ 
under which his fear can be deemed reasonable.”27 
 When an applicant has shown past persecution, then a well-founded 
fear of future persecution is presumed on the basis of the original 
claim.28 That presumption, however, may be rebutted if “[t]here has 
been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no 
longer has a well-founded fear of persecution” in his or her country.29 
The government bears the burden of establishing a fundamental 
change in country conditions by a preponderance of the evidence.30 
 In asylum claims, “[t]he persecutor must be a government official 
or persons the government is unable or unwilling to control.”31 Asylum, 
                                                                                                                      
20 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (defining “refugee”); id. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (iden-
tifying the conditions for granting asylum); Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 
2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b) (2011) (establishing asylum eligibility). 
21 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see id. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). 
22 See Japarkulova, 615 F.3d at 699. 
23 See, e.g., Oroh v. Holder, 561 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2009); Prela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 
515, 518 (7th Cir. 2005); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993). 
24 See Oroh, 561 F.3d at 68 (quoting Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
26 See Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004); Dobrican v. INS, 77 F.3d 164, 
167 (7th Cir. 1996); Castillo v. INS, 951 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991). 
27 Pilica, 388 F.3d at 950 (quoting Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620–21 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
28 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2011). 
29 Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). 
30 Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii). 
31 Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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however, is not available to victims of indiscriminate violence, unless 
they are singled out on account of a protected ground, such as mem-
bership in a particular social group.32 
B. Defining a “Particular Social Group” 
 The INA also does not define a “particular social group.”33 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has interpreted the term to mean 
a group with members who “‘share a common, immutable characteris-
tic.’”34 As the BIA explained in the case of In re Acosta, 
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, 
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a 
shared past experience such as former military leadership or 
land ownership. . . . However, whatever the common charac-
teristic that defines the group, it must be one that the mem-
bers of the group either cannot change, or should not be re-
quired to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities or consciences. Only when this is the case does the 
mere fact of group membership become something compa-
rable to the other four grounds of persecution under the Act, 
namely, something that either is beyond the power of an individ-
ual to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience 
that it ought not be required to be changed.35 
The BIA also has stated that a group must have “social visibility” and 
adequate “particularity” to constitute a protected social group.36 
 Although the circuit courts essentially defer to the Acosta formula-
tion, each circuit emphasizes different factors when deciding what con-
stitutes a particular social group.37 The Ninth Circuit, for example, re-
quires a “‘voluntary association’” or an “‘innate characteristic that is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that mem-
                                                                                                                      
32 Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2001). 
33 See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238–39. 
34 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 955 (B.I.A. 2006) (quoting In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985)). 
35 See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (emphasis added). 
36 In re A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74–76 (B.I.A. 2007). 
37 See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2005); Castellano-Chacon v. 
INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2003); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 
1998); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239–40; Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 
1985). 
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bers either cannot or should not be required to change it.’”38 The Sec-
ond Circuit, meanwhile, emphasizes the requirement of having a 
“characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes 
of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in general.”39 
 The main inquiry for all courts, however, is whether the applicant 
establishes membership in a group that shares a common, immutable 
characteristic.40 In other words, a particular social group is one united 
either by voluntary association or “by an innate characteristic that is so 
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that mem-
bers either cannot or should not be required to change it.”41 
II. Asylum Claims Involving the Narcos 
 In the context of asylum petitions based on claims of persecution 
by the Narcos, the courts have refused to find that petitioners qualify as 
a particular social group.42 For example, the courts have rejected the 
claim that a business person is a member of a particular social group.43 
In Ochoa v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that business owners in Co-
lombia who had rejected demands by Narcos to participate in illegal 
narcotics activity did not qualify as a particular social group.44 Germán 
Ochoa, the owner of a clothing store, had borrowed $20,000 to pur-
chase merchandise to sell in his store.45 Ochoa later found out that the 
                                                                                                                      
38 Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1170 (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 
(9th Cir. 2000)). 
39 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit, however, has 
explicitly rejected the notion that a particular social group must be socially visible. See Ga-
timi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009). 
40 See Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1170; Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 546; Lwin, 144 F.3d at 511; 
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239; Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). 
41 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093; see also Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he size and breath of a group alone does not preclude a group from 
qualifying as such a social group.”); Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1220 (9th Cir. 
2009) (considering factors “such as immutability, cohesiveness, homogeneity, and visibil-
ity”); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering “whether a 
group’s shared characteristic gives members social visibility and whether the group can be 
defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership”). 
42 See, e.g., Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a 
characterization such as “returning Mexicans from the United States” is too broad to qual-
ify as a cognizable social group); Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1198 
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding that noncriminal informants are not members of a particular 
social group); Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the claim 
that a business person is a member of a particular social group). 
43 See Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1171. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1168. 
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lender was a Narco.46 The Narco then pressured Ochoa “to participate 
in a narco-trafficking money laundering scheme.”47 Ochoa refused to 
participate in the scheme and, after receiving threats from the Narcos, 
Ochoa and his wife fled to the United States.48 
 The Ninth Circuit found that Ochoa was not a member of a par-
ticular social group.49 The Ochoa court stated, 
A social group of business persons in Ochoa’s circumstances is 
too broad to qualify as a particularized social group. There is 
neither a voluntary relationship nor an innate characteristic 
to bond its members. . . . There is no unifying relationship or 
characteristic to narrow this diverse and disconnected group. 
This category is too broad to qualify as a particularized social 
group for the purposes of asylum and withholding of re-
moval.50 
 The courts have also determined that noncriminal informants per-
secuted by the Narcos are not entitled to asylum because they are not 
members of a particular social group.51 In Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney 
General, the Eleventh Circuit considered the asylum claim of Diego Cas-
tillo-Arias, who disclosed information he obtained from an acquaint-
ance that worked for the Colombian Cali cartel to another acquaint-
ance that prosecuted Narcos.52 In retaliation, the cartel attempted to 
kidnap Castillo-Arias and threatened him and his family.53 Castillo-Arias 
ultimately left Colombia to come to the United States.54 The Eleventh 
Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether Castillo-
Arias’s association with a particular social group was the motivating fac-
tor behind the threat.55 On remand, the BIA found that “noncriminal 
informants did not constitute a ‘particular social group.’”56 
 In affirming the BIA, the Eleventh Circuit explained, “Narcotics 
traffickers, such as the cartel, threaten ‘anyone and everyone perceived 
to have interfered with, or who might present a threat to, their criminal 
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. at 1169. 
47 Id. 
48 Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1169. 
49 Id. at 1171. 
50 Id. 
51 See Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1198. 
52 Id. at 1191. 
53 Id. at 1191–92. 
54 Id. at 1192. 
55 Id. at 1193. 
56 Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1193. 
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enterprises.’”57 Accordingly, the court determined that Castillo-Arias 
was persecuted by the cartel not because of his membership in a par-
ticular social group, but because he had interfered with their criminal 
enterprise.58 
 The court also focused on the fact that anonymous informants are 
not visible enough to be considered a particular social group because 
“the very nature of the activity prevents them from being recognized by 
society at large.”59 Citing to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ochoa, the 
court stated that “a group of informants are, for purposes of the INA, 
both not visible enough, and, at the same time, potentially too numer-
ous or inchoate.”60 The court explained, “The fact that a characteristic 
or association is shared by a large number of people does not mean 
that either society at large, let alone other members within that same 
group, will recognize that characteristic or association. This is especially 
so when the characteristic or association is inherently secretive.”61 Ac-
cordingly, the Eleventh Circuit denied Castillo-Arias’s petition.62 The 
court, however, voiced its dissatisfaction in having to defer to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA.63 The court suggested that Congress should 
craft legislation to protect those individuals “who risked their lives and 
the safety of their families to assist our nation’s allies in the ‘war on 
drugs,’ [and who] have been ignored by our nation.”64 
 Recently, in Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit denied review 
of a petition from Mexican citizens who claimed to be the victims of 
crime associated with Mexican Narcos.65 The petitioners claimed to be 
members of a particular social group that encompassed “returning 
Mexicans from the United States.”66 In rejecting the petitioners’ claim, 
the Ninth Circuit stated that the proposed group was “too broad to 
qualify as a cognizable social group.”67 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. at 1197 (quoting the administrative record). 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1198. 
61 Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1198. 
62 Id. at 1199. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. (“We regret that Congress has not deemed it appropriate to craft some legislative 
relief for these individuals and those similarly situated. Perhaps the compelling facts in this 
case and its troublesome resolution might be the impetus for such relief.”). 
65 See Delgado-Ortiz, 600 F.3d at 1151. 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 1152. 
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 Federal courts of appeal have not ruled on asylum claims filed by 
former Mexican police officers who are persecuted by the Narcos.68 The 
escalating Narco-affiliated violence in Mexico, however, may force law 
enforcement officers who refuse to join the Narcos to seek asylum in the 
United States.69 Thus, federal courts are likely to see these claims in the 
near future. While past asylum petitions based on claims of persecution 
by Narcos have been unsuccessful, claims for asylum by former Mexican 
police officers differ from the previous petitions and present a stronger 
argument for finding a particular social group that deserves protection. 
III. The Escalating Narco Problem in Mexico 
A. The Mexican Narcos 
 Mexican Narcos, the major suppliers of illegal drugs in the United 
States, have grown more powerful recently because of the demise of the 
Colombian cartels.70 The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration be-
lieves that the Mexican cartels are beginning to show the features of 
organized crime.71 Besides drug trafficking, the cartels have been tied 
to human trafficking, arms trafficking, auto theft, and kidnapping.72 
 Currently, there are six major Narco cartels operating in Mexico: 
Sinaloa, Gulf, Beltrán Leyva, Tijuana, Juárez, and Los Zetas.73 The Si-
naloa cartel is a powerful cartel based in the State of Sinaloa and is a 
major smuggler of cocaine from South America to the United States.74 
It is led by billionaire Joaquín “Chapo” Guzmán, one of Mexico’s most 
wanted fugitives.75 The Gulf cartel is a major cartel with its center of op-
erations in the State of Tamaulipas, which borders Texas.76 The third 
                                                                                                                      
68 See, e.g., Delgado-Ortiz, 600 F.3d at 1150 (determining that “returning Mexicans from 
the United States” is too broad to qualify as a cognizable social group); Castillo-Arias, 446 
F.3d at 1198 (holding that noncriminal informants are not members of a particular social 
group); Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1170 (rejecting the claim that a business person is a member of 
a particular social group). 
69 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 
(2011); Number of Officers Killed in Mexico Border City Tops 100 as Drug War Drags On, supra note 
12. 
70 See Colleen W. Cook, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34215, Mexico’s Drug Cartels 
4 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf. 
71 See id. at 4–5. 
72 See id. at 6. 
73 See June S. Beittel, Cong. Research Serv., R 40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related 
Violence 4–5 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40582.pdf. 
74 See id. 
75 See M.J. Stephey, Joaquin Guzman Loera: Billionaire Drug Lord, Time (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1884982,00.html. 
76 See Beittel, supra note 73, at 4. 
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major cartel, Beltrán Leyva, was formerly a part of the Sinaloa cartel.77 
The fourth major cartel, the Tijuana cartel, has been weakened in re-
cent years, but still exerts significant control over the Tijuana-San Diego 
corridor and is located in the Mexican State of Baja California.78 The 
Juárez cartel is based in Ciudad Juárez, just across the U.S. border from 
El Paso, Texas.79 The sixth cartel, Los Zetas, separated from the Gulf 
cartel and now operates along Mexico’s eastern coast, through Veracruz 
and Tabasco, and into the Yucatán peninsula.80 Finally, a smaller but 
important cartel, La Familia Michoacana, is based in the central State of 
Michoacán and is involved in drug trafficking along the Mexican Pacific 
coast.81 
 Thirty years ago, the Mexican Narco cartels were not so divided.82 
Instead, they worked together as part of a loose alliance of organizations 
and there was little competition.83 The Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), which held power in Mexico from 1929 to 2000, maintained a 
“centralization of power and pervasive corruption” that contributed to 
the “relative harmony and success of the Mexican [Narcos].”84 In 2000, 
however, the PRI lost the presidential elections to the Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN), which “was unwilling to continue the corrupt relation-
ship with the cartels.”85 Consequently, the mutual relationship between 
the cartels and the Mexican government “‘fractured.’”86 The PAN re-
fused to mediate cartel disputes and, as a result, “the cartels turned to a 
retail strategy, buying protection from law enforcement agents and offi-
cials across all parties at the local level . . . .”87 The change of power has 
contributed to the increase in Narco violence in Mexico.88 
                                                                                                                      
77 See id. (“[The Beltrán Leyva cartel’s] attempt to take territory from their former Si-
naloa partners reportedly unleashed a wave of violence.”). 
78 See id. at 4, 7. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 5, 7; Sam Logan, The Evolution of ‘Los Zetas,’ a Mexican Crime Organization, 
Mexidata (Mar. 16, 2009), http://mexidata.info/id2194.html. 
81 See Beittel, supra note 73, at 5–7. 
82 See Shirk, supra note 5, at 5. 
83 See id. at 10. 
84 See id. at 10–11. 
85 See Bruce Livesey, Drug War or Drug Deal?, Gazette (Montreal) (May 22, 2010), http:// 
montrealgazette.com/news/Drug+drug+deal/3058760/story.html. 
86 See Jane Bussey, Political Reform Gave Push to Drug Lords’ Rise in Mexico, McClatchy 
(Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/09/15/52320/political-reform-gave-
push-to.html (quoting Ernesto Lopez Portillo, founding president of the Institute for Se-
curity and Democracy in Mexico City). 
87 See id. 
88 See id.; Livesey, supra note 85. 
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B. The Mexican Government’s Declaration of War Against the Narcos 
 In December 2006, President Felipe Calderón, head of the new 
ruling political party, PAN, publicly announced an attack against the 
Narcos.89 Since 2006, he has sent over 45,000 soldiers into the cities 
and towns of Mexico to combat the Narcos.90 Despite this new offen-
sive, the Narcos continue to thrive and the violence persists.91 In the 
first four years that President Calderón held office, more than 28,000 
people died in the war against the Narcos.92 
 The Narco problem in Mexico continues to escalate. Recently, the 
Los Angeles Times reported that “the cartels are smuggling more narcot-
ics into the United States [and] amassing bigger fortunes” since Presi-
dent Calderón’s declaration of war against the Narcos.93 It also re-
ported that the Narcos were “[u]ndeterred by the [estimated] 80,000 
troops and federal police officers arrayed against them . . . .”94 The gov-
ernment offensive has been unsuccessful and there is speculation that 
President Calderón’s administration is now strategically favoring the 
Sinaloa cartel— “the oldest and mightiest of the narco-empires” —in 
order to consolidate all of the cartels into a single cartel.95 Indeed, dis-
parities in arrests and prosecutions of people working for the Sinaloa 
cartel suggest that the Mexican government is favoring this cartel.96 
 Political protection for the Sinaloa cartel also suggests that the 
Mexican government may be attempting to consolidate power strategi-
cally amongst the cartels.97 Favoring the Sinaloa cartel could potentially 
allow the Mexican government to manage its war against the Narcos 
more effectively.98 The hope is that allowing one cartel to win would 
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lead to a reduction in violence.99 There would be “‘less competition 
among the organized crime groups,’” and “‘[i]nstead of fighting seven 
or eight organized crime groups [the Mexican government] will be 
fighting one or two.’”100 
 It is unlikely, however, that Mexico’s current Narco problem will be 
eliminated by consolidating the cartels into one large organized crime 
group.101 In order to succeed in its war against the Narcos, the Mexican 
government must better understand the extent of the Narco prob-
lem.102 First, the government should recognize that Narco activity ex-
tends far beyond drug trafficking.103 The Narcos derive income from 
many illegal enterprises including fraud, extortion, piracy, child por-
nography, and human and arms trafficking.104 Edgardo Buscaglia, an 
expert in international organized crime, opines that the Mexican gov-
ernment fails to recognize that only forty-five to forty-eight percent of 
the Narcos’ income is comprised of drug business.105 Second, the gov-
ernment needs to recognize that the Mexican Narcos are active in 
many other countries, not just in Mexico.106 According to Buscaglia, 
Mexican cartels are present in Argentina, Spain, and Chile to launder 
money; in Bolivia, Peru, and China to obtain supplies for their drug 
business; and in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras to work out logis-
tics for transportation.107 
 Finally, the Mexican government must recognize that it is handi-
capped in its fight against the Narcos by the inability of various gov-
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ernment agencies to work together.108 Currently, Mexican governmen-
tal agencies, such as the Mexican revenue service, the judicial system, 
the penal system, and the police forces, are all failing to work coopera-
tively; instead, they are competing with one another.109 This competi-
tion is facilitating Narco infiltration of many government entities, re-
sulting in widespread government corruption.110 The Narcos have 
infiltrated the Mexican government by financing campaigns and ma-
nipulating elections, thereby placing those individuals that they control 
in power.111 The Mexican government and its institutions must work 
together to coordinate their efforts to dismantle entities that provide 
funding for the Narcos, including those that appear to be legitimate 
but have a link to the Narcos.112 The government must also fight inter-
nal corruption, especially among high ranking politicians.113 
C. The Effect of Narco Violence on Mexican Police Officers 
 The rise of Narco violence and corruption is increasingly threaten-
ing the safety of Mexican law enforcement members.114 According to 
Mexico’s Public Safety Secretariat, since President Calderón declared 
war against the Narcos, approximately 915 municipal police officers, 
698 state police, and 463 federal agents have been killed by the Nar-
cos.115 In 2009 alone, “an estimated 35 soldiers and nearly 500 police 
died as casualties of Mexico’s drug violence.”116 “Overall, hundreds of 
law enforcement agents have been slain since the late 2006 sharpening 
of the confrontation between [Narcos] and the state.”117 
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 Narco infiltration of the police force, in particular, hampers the 
government’s efforts to respond to the problem.118 Recently, 3200 fed-
eral police officers were fired because of their association with the Nar-
cos.119 Indeed, the news is replete with accounts of corruption within 
Mexican law enforcement. The Associated Press reported in August 2010 
that four Mexican federal police commanders in Ciudad Juárez were 
suspended following complaints of corruption and drug links.120 In 
July 2010, the Associated Press reported that Mexican marines arrested 
the captain of the Port of Manzanillo on drug trafficking charges.121 In 
May 2010, the Los Angeles Times reported that an ex-Cancún mayor was 
extradited on drug charges.122 Also in May 2010, the Montreal Gazette 
reported that documents obtained by Mexican authorities from a sus-
pected associate of the leader of the Sinaloa cartel indicated that top 
police officers were on the cartel’s payroll.123 
 This infiltration into the Mexican police force not only prevents 
Mexico’s success in its fight against the Narcos, but also endangers po-
lice officers who refuse to cooperate with the Narcos.124 Recently, for 
example, the entire police force in the border town of Los Ramones, in 
the State of Nuevo León, refused to cooperate with the Narcos.125 The 
Associated Press reported that the entire force quit after gunmen at-
tacked their headquarters.126 In another instance, a police commander 
in Ciudad Juárez was arrested for coercing some of his officers into ex-
torting and planting drugs on honest officers who refused to partici-
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pate in corrupt dealings.127 Mexican police officers who refuse to join 
the Narcos are targeted and remain under threat.128 The Narcos send a 
clear message to honest law enforcement officers: either join us or we 
will kill you.129 
 Joining the Narcos can be a lucrative option for many Mexican 
police officers.130 Local police officers in Mexico earn minimal salaries 
and are susceptible to corruption.131 “Municipal Police . . . [are] sub-
ject to a choice by drug gangs— ‘plomo’ or ‘plata’ —either take a ‘lead’ 
bullet or accept a payoff in ‘silver’ to look the other way.”132 The major-
ity of municipal police officers earn $400 or less per month.133 Corrupt 
municipal officers on the Narcos’ payroll may double their monthly 
salary.134 According to Mexico’s Public Safety Secretary Genaro García 
Luna, the Narcos pay approximately twenty million dollars each month 
in “bribes to municipal police officers across Mexico, ensuring that 
their activities [go] undisturbed.”135 
 Refusing to join the Narcos is a dangerous alternative for honest 
police officers.136 Due to the Narcos’ infiltration of police forces, the 
Narcos know which law enforcement officers have refused to respond to 
their demands.137 Conversely, honest police officers do not necessarily 
know which of their fellow officers are affiliated with the Narcos.138 As 
the husband of a murdered journalist explained, when a person deals 
with Mexican law enforcement, he does not know if he is dealing with 
an honest officer or a cartel member.139 The Narcos also know which 
officers possess incriminating information.140 The Narcos will go to ex-
treme measures to prevent the dissemination of this information.141 A 
journalist from Ciudad Juárez stated that the Narcos will kill you not 
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only for what you say but also for what they think you might know.142 
Even the family of an officer who refuses to comply with the Narcos’ 
demands is in danger.143 The Associated Press reported, “In December 
[2009], hit men gunned downed the mother, aunt and siblings of a ma-
rine killed in a raid that took out kingpin Arturo Beltrán Leyva.”144 
 It is equally dangerous for police officers to leave their jobs when 
faced with the decision to participate in the corruption or be identified 
as an enemy of the Narcos.145 Quitting the force and hiding from the 
Narcos is impractical for Mexican police officers.146 Recently, the U.S. 
State Department issued a warning stating that drug violence is present 
almost everywhere in Mexico.147 The report specifically warned U.S. 
citizens to stay away from many cities including Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana, 
Chihuahua City, Nogales, Nuevo Laredo, Piedras Negras, Reynosa, 
Matamoros, Monterrey, Nayarit, Jalisco, and Colima.148 Given the pres-
ence of the Narcos throughout the entire country, former police offi-
cers who refuse to comply with the Narcos’ demands are in danger 
even when they attempt to hide.149 
 Narco violence is not limited to local police officers who refuse to 
cooperate.150 Prominent political figures and law enforcement officials 
are also targeted by the Narcos.151 For example, in August 2010, the 
mayor of Guadalupe Distrito Bravos in the state of Chihuahua was shot 
to death in front of his family after receiving threats.152 In February 
2009, the general in command of law enforcement in Cancún was kid-
napped and brutally murdered.153 Also in February 2009, the Narcos 
left written warnings on the bodies of a murdered police officer and 
prison guard that they would kill one officer every forty-eight hours 
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until the police chief of Juárez resigned from his position.154 In 2008, 
the acting chief of Mexico’s federal police was also assassinated by 
gunmen while entering an apartment.155 
 It is evident that the Mexican government has been unable to con-
trol the Narcos and protect law enforcement officers.156 President Cal-
derón himself acknowledged that the Mexican government has been 
unable to combat Narco violence successfully “with brute force 
alone.”157 When speaking of the cartel violence, President Calderón 
stated, “In the short run, we have to admit it, it’s likely that the violence 
will persist and even increase before it begins to fall dramatically.”158 
Mexico’s lack of control over the Narcos has already prompted the U.S. 
State Department to remove all children of its diplomatic personnel 
from Mexico’s business capital of Monterrey, a city in Northern Mex-
ico.159 Considering the high murder rate of former police officers, the 
comments of President Calderón, and the actions of the U.S. State De-
partment, it is clear that the Mexican government is unable to control 
the Narcos and protect its law enforcement officers.160 
 Given Mexico’s lack of control over the Narcos, it is likely that 
former police officers facing persecution by the Narcos will seek asylum 
in other countries in order to survive.161 Asylum in the United States is 
available to applicants persecuted by persons that a government is un-
able or unwilling to control.162 Indeed, the Mexican government’s in-
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ability to control Narco persecution provides a basis for former law en-
forcement officers to receive asylum in the United States.163 
IV. The Potential for Asylum Benefits Based on Membership in a 
Particular Social Group 
 There is a strong argument that former Mexican police officers 
facing persecution from the Narcos qualify for asylum protection in the 
United States. Federal appellate courts have determined that asylum 
benefits are available to applicants facing persecution, or who have a 
well-founded fear of persecution, on account of membership in a par-
ticular social group based on a “shared past experience.”164 Arguably, 
former Mexican law enforcement officers fit within the definition of a 
particular social group based on their shared past experience.165 
A. Asylum Cases Based on a “Shared Past Experience” 
  In Cruz-Navarro v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, applicant 
Miguel Cruz-Navarro, a native and citizen of Peru, was a member of the 
Peruvian Civil Guard, which later became the National Police.166 Dur-
ing his tenure with the National Police, Cruz-Navarro arrested and 
searched the homes of members of the terrorist group Sendero Lumi-
noso, an anti-government guerilla organization.167 Consequently, Cruz-
Navarro was persecuted by members of the terrorist group.168 Cruz-
Navarro sought protection from his own government, but the govern-
ment told him that he “would have to protect [his] own life.”169 Al-
though Cruz-Navarro did not “contend . . . that former members of the 
National Police [were] a social group subject to persecution,” the Ninth 
Circuit observed, “Persons who are persecuted because of their status as 
a former police or military officer . . . may constitute a cognizable social 
group under the INA.”170 
 In Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, the applicant applied for asylum 
based on her membership in the educated, wealthy, landowning class in 
Colombia that opposed the guerillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
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of Colombia (FARC).171 The applicant’s husband was killed by the 
FARC after he refused to give money to the guerillas.172 The applicant 
asked the government to investigate the murder, but a local judge in-
formed her “that pursuing the matter could endanger her children.”173 
At the time, the FARC was engaging in a campaign of widespread in-
timidation of local authorities “‘to further undermine State authority 
and destabilize the government.’”174 The Seventh Circuit observed that 
over 300 mayors had received threats and that “a total of sixty mayors 
(that is to say, one per month on average) have been killed in Colombia 
during the past five years.”175 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
applicant and her children were persecuted based on their membership 
in the distinct social group of “the educated, landowning class of cattle 
farmers targeted by FARC.”176 The court explained, 
In Acosta, the Board recognized that “shared past experiences” 
including land ownership and past military service may con-
stitute a characteristic that is a basis for a social group designa-
tion. . . . [E]ven if the family were to give up its land, its cattle 
farming, and even its educational opportunities, there is no 
reason to believe that they would escape persecution. . . . They 
have shown that their suffering was differentiated from the 
rest of the population and that FARC targeted them because 
of their particular social group identity.177 
 Another example of a social group based on a shared past experi-
ence can be found in Sepulveda v. Gonzales.178 Victor Sepulveda, a native 
and citizen of Colombia, worked for the Colombian Attorney General’s 
Office.179 Through his work, Sepulveda had access to confidential in-
formation regarding names of witnesses and government investigators 
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fighting against the Colombian government.180 Approximately one 
hundred of Sepulveda’s co-workers had been killed and thirty-six had 
been kidnapped by insurgents.181 Sepulveda applied for asylum on the 
ground that he faced persecution as a former employee of the Attorney 
General’s Office.182 The BIA rejected Sepulveda’s asylum claim.183 The 
Seventh Circuit, however, vacating the BIA’s decision, recognized that a 
shared past experience is one type of immutable characteristic.184 In his 
opinion, Judge Richard Posner stated that this characteristic “is easily 
satisfied by a group of former employees of a particular institution.”185 
He explained, “The social group to which Sepulveda belongs consists of 
former, not present, employees of the Attorney General’s Office. From 
that group he cannot resign.”186 Judge Posner indicated that Sepulveda 
could be eligible for asylum benefits if it were determined that other 
former employees of the Attorney General’s Office were similarly tar-
geted and if the “Colombia government is unwilling or incapable of 
protecting persons in Sepulveda’s position from insurgents.”187 
 A Second Circuit case, Koudriachova v. Gonzales, is also instruc-
tive.188 The applicant, a native and citizen of the former Soviet Union, 
defected from the KGB Intelligence Service and fled to the United 
States.189 Before his departure, the applicant was attacked by KGB 
agents.190 The BIA denied the asylum claim because it determined that 
the petitioner failed to establish persecution on account of any pro-
tected ground.191 The Second Circuit remanded the case to the BIA, 
concluding that the applicant could be eligible for asylum “on account 
of his membership in the particular social group of defected KGB intel-
ligence agents . . . .”192 The Court noted that the BIA had previously 
indicated that “an individual who is targeted due to [his or her] status 
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as a former police officer may be eligible for asylum as a member of the 
particular social group of former police officers.”193 The Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that being a former KGB agent was a shared past experi-
ence, like prior military service, that sufficiently constituted an immu-
table characteristic because it could not be undone.194 
 Recently, in Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit held that a 
former gang member belonged to a particular social group.195 José 
Luís Urbina-Mejia, a native and citizen of Honduras, applied for asylum 
based on membership in a particular social group.196 Finding that the 
BIA erred in determining that Urbina-Mejia was not a member of a 
particular social group, the Sixth Circuit noted that “‘being a former 
member of a group is a characteristic impossible to change, except 
perhaps by rejoining the group.’”197 The court stated that “being a for-
mer member of a group ‘is an immutable characteristic and that mis-
treatment because of such status could be found to be persecution on 
account of . . . membership in a particular social group.’”198 
B. Former Mexican Police Officers Constitute a Particular Social Group Based 
on a “Shared Past Experience” 
 The holdings in Cruz-Navarro, Tapiero de Orejuela, Sepulveda, Koudri-
achova, and Urbina-Mejia demonstrate that being a former member of a 
group constitutes a past shared experience because it is an immutable 
characteristic distinguishing a particular social group.199 Pursuant to 
these cases, former Mexican police officers facing persecution from the 
Narcos should qualify for asylum protection as members of a particular 
social group because they share a common, immutable characteris-
tic.200 This immutable characteristic is their shared past experience as 
law enforcement officials, which cannot be changed.201 They belong to 
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a social group of former, not present, police officers and “[f]rom that 
group [they] cannot resign.”202 
 It is unlikely that former police officers who refuse to comply with 
the Narcos’ demands can escape persecution.203 In Tapiero de Orejuela, 
the Seventh Circuit noted that there was no reason to believe that the 
petitioners who refused to cooperate with Narco guerillas would escape 
persecution, given the fact that the Narco guerillas had recently killed 
sixty Colombian mayors.204 Similarly, Mexican police officers can point 
to the extremely dangerous environment in Mexico and high murder 
rate of law enforcement officials to show that former police officers 
cannot escape Narco persecution.205 Because the Narcos have already 
killed over 2000 police officers, there is little hope that a former Mexi-
can police officer who refuses to cooperate with the Narcos will escape 
persecution.206 As the Wall Street Journal reported, these violent attacks 
raise concerns that “Mexico is struggling to protect the very people in 
charge of trying to attack powerful [Narcos] . . . . Nearly every week, a 
federal police officer is killed by [the Narcos].”207 
 Relocation within Mexico is an unrealistic option for former police 
officers facing persecution.208 First, Narcos are present throughout the 
country.209 Second, corrupt law enforcement officials who work for the 
Narcos know the identities of former police officers.210 Therefore, due 
to widespread corruption within the Mexican police forces, Narcos can 
easily identify and locate former police officers.211 
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 Former police officers who refuse to work for the Narcos and leave 
law enforcement cannot avoid the risk of persecution.212 These law en-
forcement officers should be eligible for asylum in the United States 
because they are persecuted on the basis of their particular social group 
identity by way of their shared past experience as former police offi-
cers.213 
Conclusion 
 It is evident that the Mexican government is unable to control the 
Narcos or protect law enforcement officers. Police officers are dying 
every day and, unless conditions change, the number of police officers 
killed by the Narcos will continue to grow. Former Mexican police offi-
cers who face persecution because they refuse to comply with the de-
mands of the Narcos are in imminent danger. It is impossible for for-
mer police officers to escape the threat of Narco persecution. Hiding is 
not a viable option because of the presence of the Narcos throughout 
the entire country. The Narcos have infiltrated all levels of the Mexican 
government and can readily identify those officers who may compro-
mise their illicit operations. The Narcos will not allow individuals who 
refuse to participate in the Narcos’ lucrative enterprises to live normal 
lives. For these former law enforcement officers, asylum in the United 
States represents the only possibility of survival. Case law concerning a 
“shared past experience” indicates that former Mexican police officers 
who face persecution from the Narcos will qualify for asylum protection 
as members of a particular social group. 
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